Arguing Class Actions is a monthly column by Adam J. Levitt for the National Law Journal.
Reprinted with permission from the August 3, 2026, edition of the National Law Journal. © 2026 ALM Media Properties, LLC. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. All rights reserved.
One of the most consequential moments in a class action rarely draws attention. It doesn’t occur at class certification, summary judgment, or trial. It occurs when the named plaintiff, the individual whose name appears in the caption and whose adequacy the court has scrutinized, can no longer serve as class representative.
Sometimes this happens early; sometimes it happens late. And it often arises under the most inconvenient circumstances imaginable. A class representative becomes seriously ill; a bankruptcy filing creates conflicts; a criminal conviction or credibility issue emerges in discovery; a parallel individual settlement moots the plaintiff’s personal claim; standing problems surface after a change in law; or a plaintiff simply loses interest in litigation that, by design, subordinates individual recovery to collective relief.
When this happens, plaintiffs’ counsel face a stark choice: seek leave to substitute a new class representative or risk leaving a certified—or certifiable—class without anyone to represent it. Defense counsel often characterize substitution as an impermissible “do-over,” evidence that the case was flawed from the start, or an effort to manufacture standing or adequacy after the fact. Courts, however, have largely rejected that framing, taking a more pragmatic—and fiduciary—view.
Substitution of a class representative is not an exotic procedural maneuver or an act of indulgence. It is a recurring and often necessary feature of class action litigation. And because class actions exist to vindicate the rights of absent class members, courts are generally—and correctly—liberal in permitting substitution where the underlying controversy remains live and the class would otherwise be left without representation.
The reasons substitution arises are varied and often unavoidable. Some withdrawals are driven by events external to the litigation. Courts have permitted substitution after the death of a named plaintiff, recognizing that the claims of the class “remain[] alive despite the named representative’s death.” James v. Jones, 148 F.R.D. 196, 202 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975)). Other withdrawals occur because of health issues or family circumstances that make continued participation impracticable. In the end, substitution of named plaintiffs for personal reasons is a “common and normally an unexceptionable (‘routine’) feature of class action litigation … in the federal courts.” Phillips v. Ford Motor Co., 435 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 2006). Rule 23 doesn’t require a class representative to sacrifice personal well-being to remain in the case.
Other substitutions arise from circumstances uncovered during the litigation itself. In Wilson v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., No. CV 18-11960 (WJM), 2020 WL 401814, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2020), the court allowed substitution after it became clear that the original plaintiff could no longer serve, emphasizing that it was “efficient and expeditious” to permit substitution rather than force dismissal and refiling. Similarly, in Birmingham Steel Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 353 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2003), the Eleventh Circuit held that a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow substitution of an inadequate class representative, reasoning that denial would waste years of discovery and undermine the efficient administration of justice.
Still other withdrawals are structural. Class actions are slow. Litigation that appears manageable at filing can stretch on for years. Courts have repeatedly acknowledged that a named plaintiff’s waning interest or inability to continue doesn’t defeat the class claims. And rightly so. The adequacy requirement exists to ensure fair representation—not to conscript unwilling litigants into indefinite service. As the Second Circuit has explained, unnamed class members’ interests “should not be ignored when circumstances deprive the party that represents them of her interest.” Klein ex rel. Qlik Techs., Inc. v. Qlik Techs., Inc., 906 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2018).
Requests for substitution often draw the most skepticism when they arise late—after class certification, after summary judgment, or on the eve of trial. But timing alone doesn’t transform substitution into gamesmanship. To the contrary, late-stage substitution is often when the court’s fiduciary obligations are at their peak.
Once a class is certified, the litigation no longer belongs solely to the named plaintiff. The certified class acquires a “legal status separate from and independent of the interest asserted by the named plaintiff.” Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 1998). At the same time, absent class members are bound by the proceedings and may be precluded from pursuing their own claims. In that posture, leaving a certified class without a representative isn’t a neutral procedural outcome; it risks extinguishing claims without adjudication.
Judge Edward Chen’s ruling in Sloan v. General Motors LLC illustrates the point. There, after years of litigation, the certified class representative sought to withdraw. General Motors moved to decertify the class, arguing that substitution at such a late stage would be prejudicial and improper. Judge Chen disagreed, holding that substitution would neither prolong the case nor prejudice the defendant. Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 16-CV-07244-EMC, 2020 WL 5517244, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2020). The timing of the request did not undermine substitution; it underscored the court’s obligation to protect absent class members when the representative could no longer serve.
The same fiduciary concern animated Judge Mary Rowland’s recent decision in In re Hair Relaxer Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation. There, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion to substitute Michigan and California class representatives after the original plaintiffs withdrew for personal reasons. Overruling defendants’ objections, Judge Rowland concluded that the substitutions were acceptable, non-prejudicial, and sufficiently timely under Rule 23’s liberal standard. In re Hair Relaxer Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:23-cv-00818 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2025). Rule 23’s adequacy requirement, the court recognized, exists to protect the class—not to provide defendants with a procedural escape hatch. See also Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:01-CV-2755-JEC, 2006 WL 739696, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2006).
That distinction has deep roots. In Sosna v. Iowa, the Supreme Court held that a class action does not become moot merely because the named plaintiff’s individual claim expires after certification. 419 U.S. at 401. In United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, the Court went further, holding that a named plaintiff may appeal the denial of class certification even after his individual claim becomes moot. 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980). These decisions reflect a core principle of aggregate litigation: the class’s interests do not rise or fall with the fortunes of a single representative.
The procedural tools for substitution are neither obscure nor strained. Courts routinely rely on Rule 21, Rule 15’s liberal amendment standard, and Rule 23’s express authorization to modify certification orders as circumstances change. Together, these provisions reflect a system designed for flexibility, rather than rigidity.
Defense objections are familiar. One is that substitution prejudices defendants by prolonging litigation. But courts consistently require a showing of actual prejudice, not abstract delay. Where substitution doesn’t alter the claims, expand discovery, or deprive defendants of substantive defenses, courts routinely find no cognizable harm. See In re Hard Disk Drive Suspension Assemblies Antitrust Litig., No. 19-MD-02918-MMC, 2021 WL 5848055, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2021). Defendants, likewise, cannot use a plaintiff’s withdrawal as a basis to terminate the entire action when other class members remain available to serve. Mauldin, 2006 WL 739696, at *2.
Another objection is that substitution reflects inadequate vetting at the outset. That critique misconstrues Rule 23. Adequacy is assessed based on information available at the time the suit is filed. To be sure, circumstances do change. But Rule 23 demands vigilance, not clairvoyance. When discovery reveals problems, substitution reflects compliance with the rule—not evasion of it.
At bottom, substitution doctrine reflects a central insight of class action law: the device is meant to transcend the idiosyncrasies and vulnerabilities of individual claimants. Class actions would fail their purpose if the rights of absent members turned on whether a single representative could, years later, continue serving.
That’s why courts properly view substitution not as a favor to plaintiffs’ counsel, but as a mechanism to fulfill their own fiduciary obligations to the class. Denying substitution when a representative must withdraw risks abandoning the very class the court has certified and undertaken to protect.
Requests to substitute a class representative are rarely welcome, often contested, and frequently misunderstood. But they are an essential feature of responsible class action litigation. When a named plaintiff must step aside, the question is not whether the class should be punished for that development, but whether the court will honor its obligation to protect the class it certified.
In most cases, the court should—and it does. Liberal substitution is not leniency. It is fidelity: to Rule 23, to absent class members, and to the principle that aggregate claims should rise or fall on their merits, not on the happenstance of personal circumstance.
Thank you to DiCello Levitt associate, Joseph “JJ” Nelson, for contributing to this column.
Adam J. Levitt is a founding partner of DiCello Levitt, where he heads the firm’s class action and public client practice groups. He can be reached at alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
